A Concert of Action ad at 72 CLOSE-UP 1 I r™ * * came rro c, asan Asm j , Kenn wj ZB n 0 ( ) ( ( s wv MARCOS m a r k^ homeland By Jill A. Murray Last years were in exile 2m"n’ i " h/« e,r h., « „, Am, « n , " .X aj-m .Murtus bunil L ShJ ^ , r VIR F C GtNLML 0-3505 O n December 15,1989, after only five hours of deliberation, a three- man, three-women jury unanimously found the late Ferdinand Marcos, and his wife Imelda, liable for the 1981 Seattle murders of Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes, both union cannery workers and prominent anti-Marcos activists. Estate ofDomingo, etal, v. Marcos, et al., charged the former Philippine president, his wife and others with the murders as part of intelligence and harassment activities against the anti-Marcos movement in the United States. The defense maintained that the men were murdered because of a dispute over dispatch of workers to the canneries in Alaska. Certain that a union dispute could not be the reason for the murders, Siime’s’sister Cindy Domingo, his partner Terri Mast, and other friends and relatives formed the Committee for Justice for Domingo and Viernes. The Committee took the unprecedented step of filing a civil suit against the former president. The Marcos Estate has been ordered to pay $15.1 million to the families of the slain men. This is the first time a foreign regime has been found liable of conspiracy and negligence by a U.S. court. Investigation during the 8J4 years following the murders yielded evidence that the Philippine government and Marcos were not acting alone but in a full concert of action which included elements of the U.S. government. The suit against the U.S. government for its alleged involvement was dropped by the court for national security reasons. Terri Mast, Silme Domingo’s partner and the mother of their two children states it succinctly: “Marcos ultimately had the trigger pulled, but people should also understand the role our own government played.” Cindy Domingo agrees. “Making the U.S. involvement known [was] probably the most important part of the case for us, so it [was] unfortunate that the U.S. defendants were dismissed . . . but we still stress that the U.S. was all part of this—just as responsible as Marcos himself. People [the American public] tend to believe that Marcos sent agents here, but the other side is that the U.S. cooperated. Domingo and Mast believe that because the U.S. government knew about the conspiracy, they could, and should, have done more to protect anti-Marcos dissidents in this country. It is apparent that U.S. intelligence was well aware of Philippine agents’ activities regarding the U.S.-based Marcos opposition. Surveillance reports and other documents were handled by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Federal Bureau of The Marcos Estate has been ordered to pay $15.1 million to the families of the slain men. This is the f irs t time a foreign regime has been found liable o f conspiracy and negligence by a U.S. court. Investigation (FBI), and the Naval Intelligence Service (NIS), among others. These documents reveal a remarkable level of knowledge regarding the Marcos intelligence apparatus, knowledge extending to the top of the U.S. government hierarchy. In 1980, Imelda Marcos met with President-elect Reagan at the Waldorf Towers in New York City. She had two goals. The first was to secure an agreement that would allow the Philippine government to increase and upgrade the presence of its intelligence agents in the U.S. in order to monitor and operate against anti- Marcos Filipinos. U.S. intelligence would conduct similar operations against the anti-Marcos movement while, at the same time, monitoring the Philippine agents. The second goal was an agreement to support passage of a U.S.-Philippine treaty which would allow the Philippines to extradite leading anti-Marcos dissidents living in the United States. Although Reagan agreed to both proposals, Congress later decided that an extradition treaty could be “inappropriately used” and denied its passage. It is understandable that the more a dictator dictates, the more the people look elsewhere, often to communism, for relief. Such was the case with the Philippines under Marcos and martial law. Our economic and military links provided the foundation for U.S. foreign policy toward the Philippines and, hand in hand with the Cold War, were central to our dealings with Marcos. During his 21 years as President of the Philippines (9 of those under martial law), Marcos and his regime drew on the ever “imminent” communist insurgency to keep Washington on its side, and to divert attention from the gross human rights abuses occurring daily in the Philippines. An outline of “talking points” for an Imelda Marcos visit with members of the U.S. Senate and House urged her to “stress that the Philippine Government maintains a strict policy of observance of human rights . . .” It stated that the First Lady “may mention that she herself is committed to the promotion of human rights . . .” [believing that] “even the most committed communist is not beyond redemption.” This same briefing paper outlines that when the topic of communist insurgency is broached, the First Lady should emphasize that “if successful, the insurgency would directly threaten U.S.-Philippine relations, particularly military installations in the Philippines.” Through four U.S. presidents— Nixon, Ford, Carter and most of Reagan’s two terms in office—the Marcoses maintained their power at the expense of the Filipino people, while Washington squinted myopically at the abuses of martial law. Indeed, during the first year of martial law, in 1972, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence noted that Marcos’ “one-man democracy” seemed aimed more “at his own political opponents than at communists . . .” In succeeding years, this observation proved to be disturClinton St.—Spring 1990 35
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