Clinton St. Quarterly Vol. 12 No. 1 Spring 1990

PLAY IT AGAIN, UNCLE SAM Propaganda and Public Diplomacy By Martin A. Lee & Norman Solomon (An e x c e rp t f ro m : UNRELIABLE SOURCES: A GUIDE TO DETECTING BIAS IN NEWS MEDIA) In March, 1982, Congressman David Bonior (D-MI) spoke fervently about Reagan’s Nicaragua policy on the House floor, warning of a “highly orchestrated propaganda effort by the administration which unfortunately the media of this country to a very large degree is buying hook, line and sinker.” Referring to the legacy of U.S. support for one Nicaraguan dictator after another, Bonior complained about “a notable lack of a sense of history in this administration and the media.” Citing several examples of “manipulated evidence” behind White House charges against Nicaragua, Bonior concluded: “Mr. Speaker, I would ask that the media of this country start focusing in on the evidence, and the manner of presentation, because I do not think the evidence bears the fruit that the administration wishes for.” Instead of heeding Congressman Bonior’s plea, the U.S. media functioned virtually as a sieve for what Abraham Brumberg, formerly with the U.S. Information Agency, described as “a flood of distortions, exaggerations and plain unvarnished lies about the Sandinistas that issue forth almost daily from the administration.” Psychological Warfare Much of the propaganda against Nicaragua was coor- ____ dinated by an Orwellian agency known as the Office of Public Diplomacy (OPD). Ostensibly part of the State Department, OPD actually took its marching orders from the National Security Council and indirectly from the CIA. A senior U.S. official described OPD as “a vast psychological warfare operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in enemy territory”—only in this case, the target was the American people. In order to elude legal prohibitions against CIA involvement in domestic operations, CIA Director William Casey transferred one of his propaganda specialists, Walter Raymond, to the National Security Council in 1982. Raymond’s job was to help organize a massive public diplomacy effort that would generate grassroots support for Reagan’s controversial—and hitherto unpopular—foreign policy ventures. Toward this end, OPD recruited five psy-ops specialists from the 4th Psychological Operations Group in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Skilled in what OPD chief Otto Reich called “persuasive communications,” these psychological warfare experts prepared “studies, papers, speeches and memoranda to support [OPD] activities.” A July, 1986 memo described the crux of OPD’s efforts: “In this specific case of Nica[ragua], concentrate on gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on [the Contras}." The idea was to slowly turn the Nicaraguan government “into a real enemy and threat in the minds of the American people, thereby eroding their resistance to U.S. support for the Contras and, perhaps, to a future U.S. intervention in the region,” a U.S. official told the Miami Herald. OPD inundated the media with glossy booklets, reports and other material, while behind the scenes it planted stories, coached journalists and lobbied members of Congress. Media critic Alexander Cockburn summarized the modus operandi of Reagan’s public diplomacy offensive against Nicaragua: “Erect a mountain of lies, and as members of the press examine each falsehood, they find themselves on a foundation of older lies still taken for granted as natural features of the landscape.” The Office of Public Diplomacy was "a vast psychological warfare operation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in enemy territory"—only in this case, the target was the American people. Financed with taxpayer’s money, OPD functioned as “an officially sanctioned leaks bureau” that sought to deceive the American people. A March 13, 1985 “Eyes Only” memo to White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan mentioned “five illustrative examples” of OPD’s ongoing “White Propaganda Operation.” That week OPD helped compose a Wall Street Journal column about “the Nicaraguan arms buildup”; assisted in “a positive piece” on the Contras by Fred Francis on NBC Nightly News-, wrote op-ed columns for the signatures of Contra leaders to appear in leading dailies; arranged a media tour for a Contra leader; and prepared to leak a State Department cable to embarrass the Sandinistas. “Do not be surprised,” OPD told Buchanan, “if this cable somehow hits the evening news.” One of OPD’s specialties was creating a crisis to sway public opinion at a crucial moment. In November, 1984, OPD officials leaked false information about an inpending shipment of Soviet MIG fighters to Nicaragua. Bolstered by over thirty OPD background briefings, the MIGs story dominated the headlines for a few days until journalists began to realize that no MIGs were headed for Nicaragua. By this time, OPD had already succeeded in drawing attention away from Nicaragua’s elections, which, otherwise might have legitimized a government that the Reagan aidministration was trying to overthrow. As former Contra leader Edgar Chamorro said of the phantom MIGs: “The timing was controlled. Events can be neutralized when people are confused or distracted. That’s why timing is so important.” OPD operations kicked into high gear whenever a congressional vote on Contra aid drew near. On December 10,1987, the day before Congress was scheduled to decide on addi- . tional funds for the Contras, OPD officials unveiled a Sandinista defector, Major Roger Miranda Bengoechea— who told a handpicked group of U.S. reporters that the Nicaraguan government planned to expand its military force to a half million soldiers, and that Soviet MIGs would be delivered by the early 1990s. Among those present during the Miranda briefing was AP correspondent George Gedda, who ignored State Department documents that contradicted claims of a massive Nicaraguan military buildup.' Gedda and fellow practitioners of Foggy Bottom journalism broke the story without mentioning a relevant fact: The U.S. government was paying Miranda $800,000 to make his ominous disclosures. As it turned out, no major expansion of Nicaragua’s regular army was being planned; the evidence actually pointed toward a troop reduction, according to Newsday, which picked apart Miranda’s charges days after Congress passed $8.1 million in new Contra aid. Lies That Echo For years, the Reagan administration alleged that Nicaragua _ was eking to export its revolution by supplying arms to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. Stories about this supposed “arms flow” continued to appear in the press even after the disclosures of David MacMichael, a former CIA analyst who resigned in protest over what he described as efforts to fake evidence of Nicaraguan military involvement in El Salvador. In June, 1984, MacMichael told the New York Times that the CIAhad “systematically” doctored evidence “to justify efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.” He reiterated these charges in testimony before the World Court, which ruled that the U.S. with the outlawed Iris Army, although he had arrested for a terrorist of guards hal |m s prote M o s c o w (AP) - Two rep i j; of the International A ll pLic Veterans, one a fornu president, were evicted f p: Embassy on Wednesday Ji to stage a sit-in and fast, ■prman Solomon, 34, who 'b n in 1970 to attend Reed Pbnthony Guarisco, 58, of tried to hold the protest p i nute meeting w ith U.S. A b tr thu r A. Hartman. The ■id by Marine guards, who p ton out in an over-the-s in an’s grip. Hl lomon, who is from Nyac hey urged the U.S. govern h Moscow’s ban on nuclear p old Hartman they would js in his secretary’s recepti ; few days as a “ presence ■• nament movement.” The ; ; zisited Oregon earlier this J d to New York about a y ; irk for the Fellowship of f ion, one of the nation’ i groups. i f lomon, who had w o rk ; h uclear and peace groups H is the co-author of thing Our Own: The Disa ; ica’s Experience w ith Central American panel swi er aeonoE OEOOA WASHINGTON (AP) - TM Klaingtr CO M P >loeooCentral America policy waa (worn InWednesdayu U* Whin Home rejected conservativedemand! ihit one member be replaced aad aa two other panel- isu expreaaeddismay over President Reagan's coarse in theregion. Minutes before the State Department ceremony, san Antonio(Texas) Mayor Henry Qaierxa. a Demo . rat on the commtwon. said the chief problemfor the "ntied Stales is the "heavy-handed" Image it has □cqulredto the region through suchactivities as"topplinggovernmentsand riggingelections" Declaringthat pursuit of suchpolicies hascoat the United States dearly and is "always a danger." CisnerosMidhehopedReaganwould takenoactionsthat ■voukl pre-empt thework of thecommlsaion Tuesday. Headed by former Secretary of Stale Henry A. Kissinger, ihe 12-member panel's mandate is to achieve a consensus on long-term policy goals for Central America and issue a final report by February. Thecommissionheldns first plenary meeting Immediately after the ceremony It will meet with Reagan Thursday Another panel member. Robert Strauss, former Democratic national chairman, said he "strongly diaa green" with aspects of administration policy, but he .<dded hedoesnot feel bound by partisan policy cooFiRST MEETING — Henry Kissinger (Tetr}, chair man of the Commissionon Central American Polihad violated international law by mining Nicaraguan harbors and directing the Contra war. The same year, a declassified State Department memo noted, “Intelligence officials claim that they can ‘hear a toilet flush in Managua.’ Yet they have not produced even a captured van or one downed plane.” In August, 1987, James LeMoyne wrote in the New York Times of “ample evidence” that Nicaragua was supplying Salvadoran rebels. Said LeMoyne: “It is questionable how long they [the rebels] could survive without it.” The media watch group FAIR publicly challenged the Times to share this “ample evidence” with its readers or retract LeMoyne’s unsourced assertions. Fifteen months later, a humbled LeMoyne wrote that “evidence of Sandinista support for the rebels is largely circumstantial and is open to differing interpretations.” Nevertheless, he tried to make his case in an article sourcing mostly unnamed “American and Salvadoran officials.” The one named source was Sergio Gutierrez, who reportedly defected from the Nicaraguan military to El Salvador, where he supposedly told all before dying in a drunk driving acci28 Clinton St.—Spring 1990

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