Inferring and Explaining

82 InferrIng and exPlaInIng t* 3 . The letter writer believes these grossly infated things about his friend because of some sort of perceptual bias. None of the above should be taken to suggest that testimony is inherently unreliable. What could be more obvious than the fact that almost everythingwe claimto knowcomes to us second- hand through the word of others? What I am suggesting is that our assessment of testimony can be structured and critically evaluated as a kind of evidence—evidence that perfectly fts the inference-to-the-best-explanation recipe. Testimony regarding Miracles In David Hume’s monumental book, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , there is a very short little argument with astounding religious implications. Hume argues that we are never justifed in accepting the testimony of others that a truly miraculous event has transpired. But since the three great theistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—all depend, at some foundational level, on reports of miracles, Hume’s argument seems to threaten their intellectual legitimacy. A full analysis of Hume’s argument, let alone a full philosophical investigation of miracles, would be the subject of a whole book, maybe a whole career. Never- theless, we now possess the tools to at least lay out the structure of Hume’s argument and per- haps to begin the process of evaluating his evi- dence. So what exactly is the argument? Amiracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a frm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against amiracle, fromthe very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experi- ence can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fre consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed amiracle, if it ever happened in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seem- ingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. Tere must, therefore, be a uniform experi- ence against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. . . . Te plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), “Tat no testimony is sufcient to establish a miracle, unless the testi- mony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish. . . .” When anyone tells me, that he saw a deadman restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the onemiracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. In the foregoing reasoning we have supposed, that the testimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the false- hood of that testimony would be a real prodigy: But