Inferring and Explaining

22 InferrIng and exPlaInIng certain cognitive state that individual “subjects” fnd themselves in or fail to fnd themselves in. For that belief to be true (or not-false) it must be dependent on things entirely independent of those subjects—the way things “objectively” are. Condition i takes care of the subjective ele- ment, and ii covers the objective. What more do we need? I have been hoping for a raise. Unfortunately, my latest evaluation lef a lot to be desired, and the state’s budget looks pretty bleak. Forever the optimist, I continue to think the best. I woke up yesterday and as I was havingmymorning cofee I glanced at my horoscope. Te entry for Pisces was way cool: “You will receive something long overdue andwell deserved. All the signs are pos- itive.”My raise! What could be clearer? I went to work with a smile on my face absolutely conf- dent that I would get the good news. And I did! Te governor decided that all state employees should get a modest salary adjustment, and that afernoon, we were all formally notifed. Te two conditions for knowledge are satis- fed. Johnson believes that he will get a raise, and it is true that hewill get a raise. Does he therefore know that he will get a raise? Most of us would be very reluctant to say he possesses knowledge. What he believes turns out to be true but merely by coincidence or good luck. Te subjective ele- ment of belief and the objective element of truth seemmuch too tenuouslyconnected.What seems to be missing is some reason or evidence in sup- port of my belief. Sure, the horoscope is a reason in the sense of providing a psychological expla- nation for why I happen to have this belief. But it’s such a poor reason—it’s so unreliable—that we attribute the belief ’s truth to good fortune and not the strength of the reason. Epistemologists have adopted the idiom of normative obligation to get at the stronger con- nection between belief and truth that is required for genuine knowledge. You are entitled to claim knowledge, according to this way of thinking about things, only if your belief is justifed —that is, just in case you have very good reason for thinking it is true. Tus on the so-called stan- dard analysis of knowledge a third necessary condition of knowledge, one that completes the package andmakes it jointly sufcient, is the justifcation condition. J knows P if and only if: i. J believes P. ii. P is true. iii. J is justifed in believing P . What Does It Take to Be Justifed? We have seen how skeptics can produce a for- midable battery of arguments designed to show that we are never completely justifed in believ- ing anything. Te problem concerns the connec- tion between truth and justifcation. Te only standard that completely eliminates the possi- bility of our beliefs being held in error is one of self-evidence or certainty. But as the Cartesian project has convincedmost of us, epistemological certainty is unattainable. Tis means that what- ever model of knowledge is fnally endorsed will be committed to some sort of epistemic fallibil- ity.Tis is not that serious aworry formost natu- ral or social scientists but does run counter to the dominant tradition in Western epistemology. Self-evidence and certainty may have set unrealistically high standards for knowl- edge, but these epistemic standards had the