Inferring and Explaining

18 InferrIng and exPlaInIng with long-dead thinkers such as Plato, Adam Smith, and Marx may strike us as an irrespon- sible waste of time and intellectual energy. To carry this example just a bit further, suppose the philosopher’s paper ofers a defnition of economic justice that suggests some kind of ten- sion with other widely held values and social policies and goes so far as to suggest that we will never have a concept of economic justice that everyone will feel comfortable with. Now the philosopher’s concern with theory and the def- nition of terms may strike us as subversive. It may be difcult and controversial to articulate a theory about the nature of economic justice that everyonewill agreewith. Nevertheless, we know injustice when we see it. And to suggest that we spend our time defning terms and teasing out subtle philosophical arguments rather than ofering constructive solutions to the obvious problems that plague our society is both dan- gerous and immoral. But all this is quite unfair. No sane philosopher is going to suggest that we spend all our time and energy in academic theoretical pursuits. Obviously, there are crises that call for immediate action, and we all rec- ognize the need to make decisions on less than perfect information. But there is also a need for abstract theoretical work. It does seem crazy to propose signifcant social changes that will afect all of us without some kind of clear under- standing of what we are trying to bring about. Pausing to refect on the nature of economic justice—defning our terms, as they say—may be worthwhile even in a time of some urgency. Please excuse the above digression. I have included it because I believe that many begin- ning students see much of traditional episte- mology in the same uncharitable light that our philosopher was portrayed. Every reader of this book is a mature speaker of English. Te verb to know and the abstract noun knowledge are fairly normal words within the English language. Obviously, we must know what they mean. We will discover, however, that it proves exceed- ingly difcult to articulate a clear and coherent defnition, or theory, of knowledge. The Myth of Defnition Tis chapter discusses the prospects for ofering a helpful analysis, or defnition, of the concept of knowledge. As a starting point, we need to take a little time dispelling a common misunderstand- ing about the importance of defnition in every- day contexts, as well as philosophical contexts. It is widely believed that people do not know the meaning of the words they use—they do not know what they are talking about—unless they can provide adequate defnitions for all those words. Tis is simply a mistaken view of meaning. Someone can be an excellent athlete—a hit- ter in baseball, for example—yet be a very poor coach or teacher of how to hit. Surprisingly, per- haps, others canbemediocrehitters but turn into outstanding hitting coaches. Te reason these things are possible is that there is all the difer- ence in the world between doing something and describing, or explaining, how to do something. Tink for a moment about those things that you aremost skilled at doing—shooting free throws, playing a musical instrument, riding a bicycle, and so on. How confdent would you be that you could teach someone else how to be skillful at these activities? Could you write a manual for them on how to do any one of these?