Inferring and Explaining

ChaPter three The Concept of Knowledge So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account, his mind does truly think of it, but he does not know it, for if he cannot give and receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to him and he is fully equipped with knowledge. —plato 1 Defnitions and Word Games Suppose that we are concerned with the ques- tion of economic justice—the fact that a few are ridiculously wealthy, while many are pitifully poor. We might convene an academic confer- ence to discuss the issue and suggest some sort of coherent social policy. Economists might tell us about how income distribution is empirically related to national productivity. Political sci- entists might tell something about relative tax rates and the amount of government services. Sociologists could address the social efects of long-termpoverty. Historians could give us some sense of whether the problem is better or worse than it was a hundred years ago. It would not be at all surprising if a philosopher contributed a paper on themeaning of economic justice. In one way, such a contribution seems necessary and foundational. Afer all, how can we reasonably construct some social policy aimed at greater economic justice if we are not crystal clear as to what we mean by this concept? In another light, however, the philosopher’s contribution seems frivolous and even counterproductive. If there is wide agreement that there is a problem that needs to be solved, the philosopher’s concern 17