Inferring and Explaining

ChaPter fIfteen Explanatory Virtue and Truth Whenever we investigate anything—black holes or the causes of the First World War or the demography of the Cayman Islands or the ambiguity of Yeats’s poetry—our intrinsic goal is to fnd the truth about something. If we did not have that goal, we would not be inquiring. —ronalD DworKIn 1 Two Huge Problems DavidH. Glass clearly articulates the two biggest challenges inference to the best explanation: Despite its intuitive plausibility, IBE faces two key challenges. First, how exactly is IBE to be understood and made precise? Tere are various conceptions of the nature of explanation, but assuming some of these are suitable for IBE this still leaves the question as to howone explanation should be compared against another so that the best explanation can be identi- fed. Second, what is the connection between expla- nation and truth? Is there any reason for thinking that the best explanation is likely to be true? Or to put it another way, does IBE track truth? Of course, no approach should be expected to lead to the truth in every instance, but if IBE is to be accepted as a ratio- nal mode of inference, there must be some reason for thinking that it provides a good strategy for determin- ing the truth. 2 Inference to the best narrative (IBN) inherits these same problems. How should one narra- tive be compared against another so that the best narrative can be identifed? And is there any reason for thinking that the best narrative is 143