Inferring and Explaining

135 a very diferent story. Life is complicated and flled with coincidences. He’d convinced the jury not to look at the Hamilton case as if it were a made-for-TV-movie, but rather as a slice of real life, full of irrelevant actions and coin- cidences. He’d asked the jurors howmany of them had taken out life insurance on a loved one and what their neighbors would have thought if the loved one died shortly thereafer. 9 Both the DA and Abe were not just telling sto- ries; they were arguing a case before a jury. Let us assume that the facts were not in dispute and looked something like the following: e 1 . Hamilton and his partner had a strained personal and professional relationship. e 2 . Hamilton had recently encountered severe fnancial problems. e 3 . Hamilton had recently taken out a sizable life insurance policy on his partner. 10 e 4 . Ten days later his partner was gunned down by a professional hit man. From the inference-to-the-best-explanation para- digm,theDAandAbeofercompetingexplanations. t 0 . Hamilton hired the hit man to gun down his partner so that he could collect on the life insurance. t 1 . Hamilton had nothing to do with his part- ner’s murder. It was pure coincidence that the murder occurred so closely to the newly acquired life insurance policy. Perhaps you’re like me and are not quite sure which of these explanatory stories is the best. I think that if I were the DA, I’d have asked the police for more investigation before bringing the case to trial. Te standard in a murder trial like this is that the evidence must show that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . Tat means not only that t 0 must be a better explanation than t 1 but that it must be much, much, much better. Stories That Make Sense of Things Perhaps themost obvious question in this entire book is what exactly is an explanation in the frst place? Science has long struck philosophers as a kind of paradigm of good reasoning. IBE comes directly from the philosophy of science and has been treated not only as a model of scien- tifc evidence but as scientifc discovery as well. Likewise, some of the most signifcant models of explanation come from the natural sciences and philosophers seeking to model scientifc thinking. We need to begin by noting that explanations are the result of things we do . We explain things. Little Johnny is an inquisitive kid. He asks a lot of questions: “Why do I have to go to bed now?” “Why was Aunt Jane so mad?” “Why do stars ‘twinkle’?” Sometimes we decline to really answer his questions: “Because I said so!” “Tat’s grown-up stuff; you wouldn’t understand.” “Gee, that’s a good question—I don’t know.” Other times, however, we do him the courtesy of responding in as truthful and informative way as we can: “You have to get up early tomor- row, and besides, I need the rest now.” “Well, I think you hurt her feelings.” “It’s complicated, but it has to do with light being refracted in the atmosphere.” So what exactly is involved when eVIdenCe, exPlanatIon, and narratIVe