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Campaigns are still about developing issues and swaying voters.” To him, Kennedy campaigns are the paradigm of political organization. From them, one can understand the unyielding, demanding nature of the Kennedy operation and why it has a reputation as a juggernaut. Over time —from Jack to Bobby to Teddy—its principles remain constant. When he discusses the Kennedy modus operand!, Doherty’s voice tightens with determination and excitement. “ Kennedy campaigns are disciplined," he says. “You have a schedule. The candidate is up and goes all day long. There is meaning and substance to the schedule. There’s a regimentation. If you were an issues guy you’d be writing a Teddy speech. There’d be somebody slotted to write Teddy speeches on left-handed midgets. There’d be someone slotted to think around corners—where we’ll be in three weeks.” But Kennedy's operation differs from a regular political machine. In a machine, the emphasis is on quantity, not quality. As long as there’s a precinct captain on the block the machine is satisfied that the territory is covered. Not so with the Kennedyites. They want more than that. “ In Indiana,” says Doherty, “we found it was disciplined. But a guy running the precinct wasn't necessarily the best guy. We would find second-string people. They were enthusiastic and were given a chance to play first string. We went with what I call one-eyed people. That's in contradistinction to the beautiful people. With the beautiful people you end up in a debate. Too many campaigns turn into internal debates. There are too many smart people who want to debate. But the one-eyed people become pretty good. You give them four things to do and they do them.” The Kennedy operation is based on clear lines of authority, a distinct division of labor, money, and loyalty. But sometimes being loyal isn’t sufficient to ensure your place at the Round Table. The case of Robert Crane illustrates how cold necessity can overtake an individual within the structure. Crane served the Kennedys dutifully in many campaigns and as state chairman of the Democratic party. When he became state treasurer everybody seemed pleased. But he turned into an obstacle when young Joe Kennedy, the senator’s nephew, contemplated a run for the office. “Jerry Doherty’s role,” says Crane, “was to find out if I was interested in running for re-election and to get the message to me that Joe Kennedy was heading in my direction. I had a further conversation with Senator Kennedy. I had an opportunity to express my intentions.” The situation became very messy. Crane’s side of the story was aired in the Boston Globe. And Joe Kennedy backed off. perhaps for reasons of his own. Crane emerged as the only dissident to survive a Kennedy coup attempt. Doherty, for his part, carried on as always, loyal to Kennedy. “When it appeared Joe Kennedy was running. I was part of the conversation,” he says. "1 thought I’d go and tell Crane this thing might happen. I never said, ‘I’ll punch you in the nose or we’ll give you a bag of money.' I wouldn’t deliver an ultimatum to anyone. I wanted to have the decency and courtesy to tell Crane. In politics, sometimes you got to do things you don’t want to do." The Young Professional as Old Pol Ted Kennedy’s Washington office looks like an anteroom in the Kennedy Library. On the wall are pictures of Ted with Bobby, with Jack, with his kids, with his mother, on a sailboat, a picture of Bobby swarmed by ecstatic crowds, a picture of Joe Kennedy, Sr., a panoramic photo of the Boston skyline, and pictures of the birthplaces of Joe Sr. (an arrow points to a building on Meriden Street, East Boston), Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy (Garden Street, North End), and John F. Fitzgerald (Terry Street, North End). In the middle of the office stands a Secret Service man, staring ihto space. The busiest man in Kennedy’s office is Carl Wagner, the senator’s political aide, hired in December 1978, filling a position that had been left vacant by Paul Kirk’s departure to private law practice in 1976. Kirk’s leaving was widely interpreted as an indication that Kennedy wouldn’t seek the presidency for a long time with a Democrat in the White House. The hiring of Wagner, in this light, was highly suggestive. He represents the new generation: he’s 32 years old. His contacts are different from those of the older Kennedy people. He’s drawn up a list of political activists to determine who can do what for Kennedy, when they can do it. and how they can do it. They shouldn't need to be told why; if they don’t know, they won’t be doing it. Though Wagner is driven by issues, and slightly disorganized, his charm, Kennedy hopes, can cultivate personal loyalty and motivation among the campaign cadres he recruits. Wagner’s day is filled with the endless ringing of the telephone, meetings, and hurrying about town. He eats no lunch and smokes too much. He relies upon instinct, contacts, and organizational savvy. The information he considers most valuable is what he hears, not what the polls tell him. In spite of the chaos in which he finds himself, he isn’t frantic and doesn’t seem overwhelmed. He’s not brash, but self- assured. He appears to possess a sense of balance and buoyancy as he navigates through the political maelstrom. “Jesus, sorry for being so rushed,” he says. Then he’s interrupted by another urgent phone call. In order to escape the phones he seeks refuge in a cavernous, empty, unlit Senate hearing room. He bites his nails. “The argument that the country is moving right assumes a definition of the electorate, that it’s divided into left, right, and center,” he says. “That’s basically incorrect. Characterizing the electorate as liberal or conservative is inaccurate. The overridingsentiment is indifference. People feel indifferent about the institutions’ ability to address critical issues. “There are two deep currents running through American history—a sense of political liberty and a hope of economic opportunity. In 1980, there’s a marked difference. There’s apprehension. The national debate has to be lifted above legislative issues to a broad discussion of the next decade. The goal of the presidency is to define the goals, gather a group of people to implement the goals, and lead the people. Is there a crisis of confidence? Confidence in what? That’s the question. The next five years are going to be difficult. Leadership will be severely tested. Precise goals around which people can be mobilized have to be set. We haven’t done that. “Will the American people respond? Absolutely. And the president must define goals precisely. He must manage the national political debate. The image Kennedy projects is a function of what he believes far more than an assessment of what he thinks is palatable. I work for him because he’s the most progressive force in American politics.” Wagner gained his organizing skills working for organized labor and his practical experience in politics working for George McGovern in 1972 and for Jimmy Carter in 1976. “ I learned in the McGovern campaign,” he says, “that some of the personnel decisions are.of great consequence. I learned that there is a terrific sentiment in the country for statements of conviction. And I learned that in Iowa in January it’s zero degrees.” “Give Teddy a Job” The Ted Kennedy that Gerard Doherty went to work for is a different man from the one. Carl Wagner went to work for. Kennedy was not always a NOW SERVING LUNCH AND DINNER 22
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