Clinton St. Quarterly, Vol. 1 No. 4 | Winter 1979 (Portland) /// Issue 4 of 41 /// Master# 4 of 73

Dhe KennedyMystake: Why D os t 3 h e e R u n , O ’ Ged, When Ohee Couldst D r ive? By Sidney Blumenthal There were three schools of thought among Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s aides and advisers on the question of his presidential candidacy. The first group was hesitant and cautious, arguing that 1984 would be Ted’s year, that it was difficult as well as heretical to run against an incumbent president of your own party, and that it would not be easy to dislodge him, regardless of his standing in the polls. Even if Kennedy did succeed in wresting the nomination, the party might be so-rent apart that it would precipitate a Republican victory. At first. Kennedy himself adhered to these precepts. Another group of advisers was also worried about Republicans. This group, consisting of Kennedy’s colleagues in Congress, approached him as early as the spring of 1979. They feared that if Jimmy Carter were the Democratic nominee the Republicans might capture the Senate and many seats in the-House. Kennedy appeared to these politicians as a savior of their committee chairmanships. Yet another group was disturbed about the direction of the country and Carter's incompetence and conservatism. These were Kennedy’s young, liberal aides and Kennedy’s academic advisers, who had once hoped to be brought into the Carter administration. at least for conferences. As for Kennedy himself, his posture of holding back a decision, so tantalizing to the press, had developed into a strategy itself. He had no campaign, and that was his campaign. It allowed Carter to sink low enough in the polls so that an announcement by Kennedy would be looked upon as an act of mercy. Kennedy's strategy was simply to be Kennedy, an ingenious tack, the ultimate image making, being yourself. But that wasn't possible any longer. Draft Kennedy groups sprouted in numerous states, and Kennedy’s Teddy considers the possibilities. fabled organization could maintain only discreet, distant contact. “ I didn't want to go into the army, but I was drafted,” said Tim Hagen, chairman of the Cuyahoga County Democratic party. “When your country drafts you. you have to go.” Kennedy was still cautious. Yet he was also hurt and angered by the treatment he was receiving from Jimmy Carter’s White House. Carter and his aides believed that a show of bellicosity and bad manners could scare Kennedy out of the race. Carter neglected to send Kennedy an invitation to the White House dinner for Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, and he refused to appoint an old Kennedy friend, Archibald Cox, former Watergate special prosecutor, to a U.S. Circuit Court judgeship. Calls from Kennedy’s office to the White House were rarely returned, and when they were, they were invariably late. Finally, Jimmy Carter pointedly declared that if Kennedy ran he would “whip his ass,” further arousing the ire of the Kennedy family. During a long vacation in August on Cape Cod, sailing his sloop around Hyannis. Kennedy considered his options. His family, feeling insulted by Carter, gave their assent to a campaign. The reason Kennedy contemplated the race was triggered by the swirling debate within his inner circle, but that was more effect than a cause. The real impetus for his candidacy came from outside. He exists on a different plane from other politicians. Observers generally credit this to ethereal personal qualities such as charisma. He also has access to unlimited financial resources and a first-class staff. He presents himself as an ideal to politicians themselves; he has a cerebral surface and a hard political interior. But Kennedy appears as the figure he is in great part because of public desire. The Kennedy candidacy is not a simple dream. He represents the central element in a dream of expectations, draw-n from the frustrations of the past, an incapacity to realize desires in the present, and grand hopes for the future. He is the object of wish fulfillment. His presidential campaign is fueled by these intensely vivid dreams more than anything else. Consequently, Kennedy doesn't have to manipulate images or sway with every political breeze. He is the symbol himself. If elected president he promises to be our Kennedy. The common reference to the Kennedy dream is to Camelot, the mythical kingdom of King Arthur and his Round Table. After President Kennedy’s death, his widow told Theodore White, author of the Making o f the President series, that she wished her husband’s reign could be remembered like Camelot. She said Jack listened to the record a lot. So Camelot has come to stand for an administration of elegance, youth, and action; in other words. The Best and the Brightest without irony. But Camelot refers to more than a musical comedy version of history. The Arthurian legend is a profound myth, befitting the Kennedy epic. The Kennedy story as Arthurian legend, however, makes sense only after the assassination of Jack. The key to the myth is not that Camelot was once a “shining spot.” but that it has fallen on hard times. This is a myth about the return of the king, a myth with A WOMAN'S PLACE A COLLECTIVELY-RUN FEMINIST BOOKSTORE open 11-8 M -T 1 6 -6 W -S a t. Portland's largest selection o f women's books & records free lending library; in fo rm a tion & referral 1300 SW Washington 226 -0848 20

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