would be to provide various incentives for U.S. corporations not only to disinvest from South Africa but also to reinvest in one of the other southern African states. SADCC is beginning to make trade and investment a major thrust of its programs. Already its intraregional trade promotion currency is U.S. dollars, which might facilitate increased trade and investment by American firms. DEFENSE ut it is unrealistic to expect U.S. companies to make such reinvestment on any significant scale as long as the South African Defense Force and its surrogate rebel armies continue to launch attacks against regional targets. And economic development in general is not possible in countries whose dominant concern—rightly so, in these cases—is security. For this reason, it is crucial that the United States and other Western powers providing southern African states with economic development fund ing also provide su ff ic ien t assistance for defense against aggression. The politics of southern Africa has been plagued by a glaring contradiction: the United States and other Western nations have seemed incapable of supporting the legitimate security interests of black states in the region, while in the past they have eagerly given military aid to South A frica—even supporting its nuclear power program, which may have led to a nuc lea r weapons capab ility. If, as .Chester Crocker recently stated, the emphasis of U.S. policy in Africa is the relationship between “ political and economic stability,” then Washington must take southern African nations’ security concerns seriously. Currently, U.S. defense assistance is woefully inadequate. In 1986, out of the relatively small sum of military aid provided to the frontline states, the largest share went to Botswana and Malawi (which received, respectively, $9.3 million and $1.3 million); smaller amounts were sent to Swaziland, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, and nothing at all to Lesotho and Zambia. The $11-mil- lion total of military aid to the region conyls Jesse Jackson has stated, Africa needs an economic development scheme on the scale of the postWorld War II Marshall Plan. The United States should also treat the leaders and people of southern Africa with the same respect the United States showed Europe. stitutes only 5 percent of the entire southern Africa foreign assistance budget. That figure needs to be increased; a variety of new programs needs to be implemented to enhance security. To begin with, the United States should shift gears and help the frontline states recover from the disruptions caused by Pretoria’s destabilization campaign rather than abet that campaign. Through USAID Security Supporting Assistance programs, funds could be provided to assist refugees, help solve balance-of-payments problems, provide infrastructure support, and otherwise counteract the .damage inflicted by the regional conflict. In addition, just as Western nations airlifted oil to Zambia during the Rhodesia crisis, air power might be used now to deliver critical resources where insurgents have made their acquisition by normal means either dangerous or impossible or where South Africa is successfully employing strangulation tactics. Another important step which is already being taken is to make SADCC projects less vulnerable to attack. For example, relatively safe areas could be selected as project sites, and the timetable for completing the projects might be accelerated. Technical measures such as built-in safety features and monitoring devices might also be considered. Some U.S. policymakers and members of Congress have opposed such aid in the past. In 1979, State Department director of policy planning Anthony Lake stated that putting arms into the conflict in southern Africa would be “ inappropriate,” violating “American domestic attitudes.” During congressional authorization deliberations in 1981, Representative Millicent Fenwick argued “ that there was a basic policy of our government not to give FMS [Foreign Military Sales] credit assistance to any of the frontline states for fear that military assistance would fuel the conflicts within that region.” Instead, it has been argued, economic assistance can be used as a valid substitute for military assistance. But U.S. policy on military aid has been inconsistent, if the goal is to avoid exacerbating the regional conflict. Aid to UNITA, for example, only inflames the civil war in Angola, whereas military assistance to Luanda might well promote stability by increasing Angola’s ability to deter attacks from both South Africa and UNITA. And the persistence of conflict in the region, even while Washington has refused military aid to frontline states, serves to emphasize the fact that the most destabilizing force in the region is South Africa. In light of Pretoria’s apparent determination to continue to destabilize and weaken its neighbors, the U.S. policy of refusing aid to frontline states should now be rescinded. BEYOND SANCTIONS y now, it is beginning to seem that although international sanctions were in te n d e d , re a s o n a b ly enough, to bring serious pressure on the white minority regime in Pretoria, they are actually resulting in only a particular kind of disinvestment: firms have withdrawn management responsibility but keep making their products available, thus continuing to profit from the relationship with South Africa. This is no reason to denounce the general principle of sanctions. Rather, we should take this occasion to fine-tune the strategy by focusing sanctions more effectively on the continuing trade mechanisms of U.S. firms and by pursuing a more comprehensive, regionwide policy. The SADCC countries do have the potential, if they receive adequate aid, to achieve the political stability and economic development that would provide a long-term regional antidote to apartheid. This, above all, is why U.S. policy must continue to undergo a metamorphosis. Through Congress, the American people have communicated their desire that the United States work toward change in South Africa; now that end must be pursued with the necessary means, including greatly increased levels of both economic and security assistance to the frontline states. Another step would be a positive U.S. response to the proposal recently made by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, chairman of the frontline states, that Ronald Reagan visit southern Africa or that leaders of these states visit him in Washington. This initiative might have begun an extremely important dialogue. Given the cynicism toward U.S. policy that is widespread in southern Africa, it represents great courage and eagerness for regional peace and development on the part of these leaders. But Reagan’s rejection of this overture seems to confirm the suspicion that U.S. policy toward the region, rather than pursuing America’s interests in a logical and positive fashion, is a strange mixture of rigid ideology and color-consciousness. Reagan could become a formidable force in the next stage of the struggle against apartheid. Instead, he is once again a barrier to the genuine independence of the southern African states. Unfortunately, the kind of “ Marshall Plan” envisioned by Jesse Jackson may be somewhat naive; Washington may not be willing to treat African states as genuine “ allies.” Only by doing so, however, will Washington be able to strike at the heart and tentacles of apartheid and, at the same time, to pursue long-term U.S. interests in the region. Ronald Waters, professor of political science at Howard University, is the author of South Africa and the Bomb (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986). He was a member of Jesse Jackson’s delegation that visited the southern Africa region last August. This excerpt is reprinted with permission from the author and from WorldPolicy Journal ($18/yr.—777 United Nations Plaza, NYC, NY 10017). 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