BEYOND T T Then the Reagan administration took office, it de- r r veloped its ownparticular rationalefor U.S. relations with South Africa. Among the factors it cited were South Africa ’s strategic position on the oil routes around the Cape of Good Hope, the South African market for U.S. goods, U.S. investments in the South A frican economy, South Africa ’s standing as an ‘'anticommunist” state in the region, and, perhaps most important, South Africa ’s supply of strategic minerals. Last July, in a White House speech, Reagan reiterated his administration’s view that these considerations determ ined U.S. interests in the southern African region. , Botswana exports diamonds, and possesses undeveloped reserves of iron, manganese, chromite, and uranium. Mozambique is also rich in strategic minerals, although its exact potential remains largely unknown because of the lack of exploration prior to independence. The one possible exception to this list of minerals available outside South Africa is platinum-group metals. And even in this case, Zimbabwe may prove to be a source. This uncertainty—reflecting an Foremost among these was the March 1986 decision to provide aid to the UNITA rebels, thus extending the Reagan Doctrine to southern Africa. At the same time, the White House has issued only the mildest of rebukes to South Africa for its repeated incursions into southern Angola, even though such moves reportedly disrupted U.S. diplomatic efforts to secure an agreement with the Angolan government on Namibian independence. Thus the administration has not only Yet it makes little sense for the United States to remain so closely connected with South A fr ica—and hence with apartheid. For one thing, the white minority regime will almost certainly have to give way, sooner or later, to the black majority. Furthermore, South Africa is not the only country in the region where U.S. interests can be served; indeed, a more stable southern Africa can also be a source of raw materials, provide opportunities for investment, and satisfy security concerns. Thus an informed U.S. self-interest does not dictate continued links with Pretoria but, rather, better relations with the governments and 100 million inhabitants of the other regional nations. Take the issue of sea lanes, for instance. If the United States wants to protect oil routes, it could, instead of depending on South Africa, build up the navies of the coastal states of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola, and strive more earnestly for the independence of Namibia. Eventually, the United States might secure naval berthing rights in these countries, as it did in Somalia and Kenya. Minerals provide another important example of the available alternatives. Currently, imports from South Africa account for 67 percent of the industrial diamonds used in the United States, 67 percent of the platinum, 56 percent of the chromium, 38 percent of the vanadium, 33 percent of the manganese, 24 percent of the uranium, and an undetermined amount of the gold. It is conceivable, though, that these minerals could be obtained from other countries if the West were to extend the same financial and technical assistance to them that it has given South Africa. Angola is very rich in resources, exporting petroleum, diamonds, and iron; it also has copper, uranium, and manganese. Zambia has cobalt, uranium, and gold, and exports copper. Zimbabwe mines 40 minerals, including gold, nickel, coal, lithium, copper, chrome , and fe rroch rom ium . ignorance of the region’s resources—results from the historical patterns of Western investment, which has developed South Africa’s resources while neglecting those of other countries. By 1984, the total value of all U.S. private bank loans to South Africa was roughly $4.6 billion, whereas between 1980 and 1984 Zimbabwe was suffering a “ capital drought.” In some cases, these discrepancies have been a matter of deliberate U.S. policy. The Reagan administration eschewed a strategy of “ punitive sanctions” against South Africa at the same time that it was levying just such sanctions against other states in the region. For example, in 1983 Washington huffily withdrew $5 million in aid to Mozambique; by 1985 relations had improved, resulting in a U.S. promise of “ nonlethal” military aid—yet no such aid was ever delivered. U.S. aid to Zimbabwe has been steadily reduced, from a high of $75 million in 1982, to $65 million in 1983, $40 million in 1984, $30 million in 1985, and $25 million in 1986—all, apparently, in retaliation for Zimbabwe's “ pro-Soviet” foreign policy. In the fall of 1986, miffed over a July 4 speech by a Zimbabwean official strongly critical of U.S. policy toward South Africa, the White House refused to release $13.5 million in aid already allocated for Zimbabwe. It is the Reagan Doctrine—the recasting of regional issues into East-West terms and the support of insurgencies in a campaign against communism—that leads the administration to make some of its most damaging policy initiatives. heightened the civil war in Angola but, by enshrining anticommunist ideology as the basis for its approach to the region, has also prevented U.S. policy from being as flexible as it should be. The United States needs to make a transition to improved relations with the regional states, looking ahead either to the arrival of a black government in South Africa or to the improved economic viability—including the capacity to supply minerals— of the other countries in the region. A NEW APPROACH he fact that Congress overrode Reagan’s veto of sanctions legislation indicates how much domestic concern there has been over U.S. policy toward southern Africa—particularly toward South Africa. Yet, sanctions alone against South Africa will not be adequate; there will also need to be a complementary strategy of contributing to the economic development and the defense of the frontline states. This kind of approach will have to be worked out in cooperation with leaders in the region, to ensure that U.S. policy reinforces efforts already being made. As Jesse Jackson has stated, Africa needs an econom ic deve lopm en t scheme on the scale of the post-World War II Marshall Plan. Not only does this analogy indicate the magnitude of the necessary aid, but it also suggests that the United States should treat the leaders and people of southern Africa with 6 Clinton St. Quarterly—Spring, 1987
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