ANCTIONS SU] It is the Doctrine recastim issue, tend AND THE REAGAN DOCTRINE agan of regional into East-West and the communism that leads the administration to the same respect the United States showed Europe—something, many observers claim, that it has not done in the past, with a resulting loss of consistency in its policy toward Africa. Even before the recent international clamor for sanctions against Pretoria, those states living in the shadow of apartheid recognized the need to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. At a meeting of nine countries in Lusaka in April of 1980, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was created to foster “economic liberation.” SADCC represents a clear rejection of a rival vision for the region: South Africa's Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), through which Pretoria has sought to reinforce existing economic links—by offering joint economic projects and development assistance—and thus to maintain its control over regional affairs. In August 1986, at a meeting ot tne Southern African Customs Union, the South African spokesman announced that his government would pass on sanctions intended for it to neighboring nations and, furthermore, would impose its own sanctions on the frontline states. In the communique issued from Botswana during Jesse Jackson's Africa tour, it was stated that in light of South Africa’s intentions “the world community should carefully consider increased economic support for [the frontline] states.” Washington seems to have begun to do so. In July, Reagan announced that Secretary of State George Shultz and AID administrator Peter McPherson would study the U.S. assistance role in southern Africa to determine “what can be done to expand the trade, private investment, and transport prospects of southern Africa’s land-locked nations.” The president subsequently suggested that $500 million of additional funding might be made available for regional projects such as those undertaken by the SADCC. And Shultz emphasized that the joint AID-State Department study would aid for the frontline states—that the next phase of the struggle against apartheid must be fought. Comments by members of Congress and State Department officials indicate that the evolving aid package to southern Africa may add up to no more than a five-year, $500-million program emphasizing regional transport, harbor rehabilitation, and food security. And even this amount of aid may run into problems in the White House, given the contradictions between this sort of devel- opment scheme and the Reagan Doctrine. Yet despite these potential obstacles, the time is now right for work toward a major new initiative. A number of efforts have helped to set the stage: Jackson’s call for increased aid, trade, and investment with each of the frontline states; the State Department’s continuing attempt to pursue a diplomatic strategy; and the November 1986 visit to Washington of SADCC chairman, Vice President Peter Mmusi of Botswana. Mmusi and his delegation expressed dissatisfaction with the current level of support for SADCC and asked for clarification of the Reagan administration’s proposed $500-million package of regional economic assistance. [Author's update: Currently two proposals are on the table. The administration is asking for a $93 million supplemental proposal for Fiscal Year 1987-’88, to be followed by $400 million over the period FY ‘89-’92. This is inadequate and puts the heavy burden of funding onto the next administration. Bills in both the House (HR1034, sponsored by Rep. Bill Gray—D-PA) and Senate (S475, sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Weiker) call for $100 million in immediate supplemental funding for FY’87 and $700 million over the next consecutive five years.] Yet even if Washington does pledge a substantial amount of economic aid for development, there will be much more it needs to do to alleviate the regional effects that sanctions against South Africa will have. One obvious line of action focus on "developing transportation routes and industry along the major alternative corridors, adding to the locomotive and rolling stock of the frontline states and stimulating more trade between South Africa’s neighbors.” Shultz’s emphasis on alternative corridors, which reorient regional trade away from South Africa, stands in contrast to remarks Reagan had recently made about the economic integration of the regional states under the leadership of South Africa—“the industrial engine upon which their future depends,” as he put it. And it is striking that Shultz prominently cited the Beira Corridor as an example of intended U.S. assistance, since that project is based in Mozambique, a country that would seem to be a candidate for the application of the Reagan Doctrine. Yet Shultz tookjhe eminently reasonable view that the United States would aid SADCC “not simply as gestures against South Africa,” but because SADCC’s transport projects “are solid foundations for the future of the regional economy.” There is a question, though, of whether U.S. aid will rise to meet southern Africa’s needs. SADCC projects still require an additional $2 billion in funding. If that were the extent of the region’s needs, a U.S. commitment of $500 million might seem reasonable. But to this $2-billion figure must be added increased sums to assist refugee resettlement and to repair the infrastructure damage caused by Pretoria’s regional destabilization tactics, and an additional $2 billion for security assistance over the next five years. The United States is already involved, along with the Netherlands and Sweden, in financing the $270-million Beira Corridor project, and AID is reportedly in the process of drafting a request for development projects in Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and Malawi. Nevertheless, even with this substantial multilateral participation, pledges of support need to be dramatically increased. It is at this level—securing additional make some ofits most damaging policy initiatives. yisurgenctes in a ampaign against Clinton St. Quarterly— Fall, 1987 13
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